Despite the New Orleans Saints’ Super Bowl victory in February, the American Gulf Coast has not had a good five years. This year there was the spill that ruined the fishing and oil industries. Hurricane Katrina brought chaos to residents of the gulf region, specifically New Orleans. It was an extremely expensive natural disaster in U.S. history, and took the lives of many people. August 29, 2005 was the day that Katrina changed the lives of the residents of New Orleans, Louisiana. There have been a lot of televised broad castings, news paper articles, and internet blogs about the fifth anniversary of Hurricane Katrina, but the stories that are being televised or released are not conveying to others what needs to be communicated.
The American government’s shameful and delayed reaction to the crisis cost the republicans as many voters blamed the insufficient handling on the president (at the time) George W. Bush, who can forget the “Brownie, you’re doing a heck of a job” comment by Bush in reference to FEMA director Mike Brown as many suffered. The storm that would wreak so much devastation started out relatively tame. While New Orleans had been spared a direct hit by the powerful winds of the storm, the true threat was soon apparent. The levee system that held back the waters of Lake Pontchartrain and Lake Borgne had been completely overwhelmed by 10 inches of rain and Katrina’s storm surge. It was said that the levees were even bombed in 50 different areas. Some people that live in the areas of the levees said that heard explosions right before the flooding of majority of the city.
Prior to the storm, the mayor of the city (at the time), Ray Nagin, issued a mandatory evacuation order. But majority of residents could not or would not leave. They either remained in their homes or sought shelter at locations such as the New Orleans Convention Center or the Louisiana Superdome. By August 30, 2005 majority of the city was underwater. Many local companies and agencies found themselves unable to respond to the frantic situation, as their own headquarters and control centers were under water as well. With no relief, and in the absence of an organized effort to restore order, looting became prevalent. There were stories released of helicopter rescues from rooftops in the flooded Ninth Ward soon mixed with tales of chaos from the crowded Superdome. The residents of New Orleans were told to go to the Super Dome for food and shelter, but when they arrived they did receive shelter but they did not receive food. After sitting for hours the residents became hungry, some even needed medicine to stay healthy and or alive. They decided to go into stores to retrieve those items since they were not given at the Super Dome. Once they tried to get the things they needed to live the authorities (such as police officers) greeted them with guns advising them not to get food, water or medicine to survive, and go back to the Super Dome to wait for help. They waited for days. They were not allowed to walk across the bridge into a different city to get help. They basically were told to sit in misery to die. Then there were stories released to the public that the residents were looting the stores… Not getting what they need to survive but looting the stores. The residents could not get the bare minimum of food and water, or even a bus ride to the next city to escape the water that surrounded them with floating dead bodies. Hours after, buses started to arrive to pick up the evacuees and or bring food. It seemed as if it was not enough of food and or buses being delivered. How could a city of people not receive help for the rest of the United States? How could the United States always help other countries when they are in need, but when a small percentage of their own country need help, they drag their feet. That showed the importance of helping the people in the city, which was obvious that it was not important. There were also stories released that the residents were shooting at the helicopters that were trying to save them, which slowly revealed the truth that no one shot at the helicopters. “One person said that her family's signals for help were ignored by rescuers; instead of responding to their signals, the helicopters were going back and forth getting people from the richer neighborhoods” (Ace, Cordasco, Eisenman, Glik, Golden, page 277). Before releasing those horrible stories that was not true, they should have prevented the crises. Preventing crises “research can often uncover trouble spots and public concerns before they become news. Analyzing complaints made to a toll-free number or monitoring chat rooms on the Internet might tip off an organization that it should act before a problem attracts media attention.” (Cameron, Wilcox, Reber, Shin, page 117) Most buses drove away empty leaving the residents hurt, upset and confused.
On August 31, 2005, the first group of evacuees arrived at the Red Cross shelter at the Houston Astrodome. By September 1, 2005 people were seeking shelter under the damaged roof of the Superdome, and many more had gathered at the Convention Center. Shortages of food and potable water quickly became a bigger an issue, and the daily temperatures reached 90 °F. An absence of basic hygiene combined with the dirty floodwaters created a community health disaster.
Several days after, on September 2, 2005, the effective military presence was established in the city and National Guard troops gathered together to distribute food and water. The evacuation of hurricane victims continued, and crews began to rebuild the breached levees. On September 6, 2005, the local police estimated that there were still many residents left in New Orleans. As the recovery began, dozens of countries contributed funds and supplies, and Canada and Mexico deployed troops to the Gulf Coast to assist with the cleanup and rebuilding. U.S. Army engineers pumped the last of the floodwaters out of the city on Oct. 11, 2005, several days after Katrina made landfall. Ultimately, the storm caused more than billions of dollars in damage, and it diminished the population of New Orleans into a fraction of its former size.
The scale of that human dislocation is mind blowing. According to the 2000 census, New Orleans had a huge population, and according to the mid-year U.S. census survey of 2006, 11 months after Katrina, New Orleans had a population of not even half of what it had initially. That demographic shift was quite telling. It changed the complexion of the MSA also known as the metropolitan statistical area. It changed both in terms of age and racial composition.
“The racial makeup of the metropolitan statistical are, also known as the MSA, changed after Katrina. Prior to Katrina, non-Hispanic, and Whites made up 54.6 percent of the MSA population 1 year and over. The people who stayed within the MSA was 66.8 percent of the population 1 year and over was non-Hispanic and White, but those that moved out of the MSA were 32.1 percent non-Hispanic White. Likewise the Black or African American population dropped from 35.7 percent of the population 1 year and over to 21.5 percent. African Americans represented 59.3 percent of the movers out of the MSA. Other races and ethnic groups were too small to show any significant change [of the MSA]” (http://www.britannica.com/blogs/2010/08/remembering-hurricane-katrina-five-years-on-picture-essay-of-the-day/).
While New Orleans and the Gulf Coast have made great strides in recovering over the five years, Orleans Parish still struggle until this day. The most recent disaster to transpire to its residents of the millions of barrels of oil spilling into its waters and washing up on its shores, continues to further test the courage of even the strongest willed of the regions people.
“These things, Katrina, the breach of the levees, and now this, the greatest oil spill in the history of the world, that's a lot for any place to take in less than five years. That is a lot. And I know, and they know, they're very resilient, strong, fierce proud people. But they're still human beings nonetheless, and another one would really hurt. We don't know how the story's going to end, because it's not over yet. That oil is still there. And we're not through hurricane season yet. We've been lucky so far” (Itzkoff, page C1).
Doubt of authorities, among many other factors, appears likely to have played a role in New Orleans residents' reactions to evacuation warnings and public health authorities' suggestion. Because prior to the hurricane’s “hit” the New Orleans residents were of minority race or ethnicity and there is a long history of minority groups in the United States distrusting the medical and public health leadership. Furthermore, distrust of authorities among New Orleans' impoverished residents is rooted in local history. In 1927, The Great Mississippi Flood was threatening to destroy New Orleans, including its crucial downtown regional financial institutions. To avert the threat, and in part to stabilize the financial markets, it was decided to perform a controlled break of the New Orleans levees, thereby selectively flooding poor areas and saving financial institutions. This event lives on in the memories and oral history of the residents of the deliberately flooded areas.
“The salience of trust and distrust was vividly demonstrated in interviews we performed from September 9th through 12th, 2005, days 11 through 14 after Louisiana landfall of Hurricane Katrina. As part of a study of the facilitators and barriers to evacuation,4 we interviewed 58 English-speaking adults who were living in Louisiana prior to landfall of Hurricane Katrina and currently receiving shelter in one of three Houston, Texas, evacuation centers (The Reliant Center, The Astrodome, and The George R. Brown Convention Center). Because our semi-qualitative interviews did not include specific queries about trust and distrust, we were struck by the frequency and depth of distrust reflected in the spontaneous statements of the evacuees we interviewed. This report is intended to describe and contextualize those statements” (Ace, Cordasco, Eisenman, Glik, Golden, page 277).
“Not surprisingly, competency, the belief in another's qualifications to perform a specific act, was the category of distrust that was mentioned most frequently by interviewees. All levels of authority, from the federal and local government officials, to the emergency workers, were the subjects of these statements. The perceived incompetence was summed up in the statement of one participant who said, "They could of did a lot better than what they did." Another said "the whole deal was a total letdown" ” (Ace, Cordasco, Eisenman, Glik, Golden, page 277).
“Several people went further when discussing their distrust by addressing a second element of trust, perceived equity. The equity component of trust is the belief that one is being treated fairly, without consideration of class, race, gender, or other characteristics. Seven people told us that they believed that the preparations or response were performed ineffectively or slowly because of the race or socioeconomic composition of their neighborhood. One person stated:
If the President would have stepped in when they give that evacuation just like they were going to send six million dollars to save a whale, send all our men to Iraq, and send food and shelter and money over there, why couldn't he do it for the poor neighborhoods? Distrust was expressed not only for government leaders but also for the people working on the evacuation. "Another perceived that he was discriminated against once he did receive help, recalling:
I got in one of the military trucks and it dropped us off in the middle of the interstate because Jefferson Parish, which is the neighboring parish, they made it clear they didn't have any water, they didn't have any shelter, they didn't have any food. So what they're saying is they didn't want any of Orleans Parish residents in their parish. See, Orleans Parish is 87% Black and Jefferson Parish is predominately White, so they didn't want that there” ” (Ace, Cordasco, Eisenman, Glik, Golden, page 277).
“The fiduciary component of trust, in which people trust others to act with their best interests and well being in mind, was an element of many evacuees' distrust. Those who commented on this generally linked it to economic issues, and not race. For instance, the common belief that the rich are privileged over the poor in disaster response is illustrated by one man's comment:
I've seen it on floods. We had some floods a few years back and you either take out this whole bunch of factories and the whole state's economy or 25 starving families . . . So what do they do? They knock a hole in the levy over here and knock these people out of pocket, destroy them, and they keep the big money in. Another interviewee expressed doubt that the officials had acted in the best interests of the public with the statement they could have saved people if they really wanted to save people" ” (Ace, Cordasco, Eisenman, Glik, Golden, page 277).
“A striking element of distrust expressed by interviewees was perceived dishonesty, or a lack of truthfulness and sincerity. Eight people we interviewed did not believe the reports in the media and claims of the authorities that the flooding in their neighborhoods came from the levees being overwhelmed by storm waters. Two people stated that they believed that the water was diverted into the poor neighborhoods to save the rich neighborhoods. Explaining how "the politicians broke the pump," one individual said: They let the waters go in the poor neighborhoods and kept it out of the rich neighborhoods, like that French Quarter where tourists go at. Six people went further and stated that they believed that the levees were intentionally broken. One person stated:
He sacrificed New Orleans. He cut that 17th bridge, because you've got to sacrifice something. Donald Trump is putting the tower on Canal Street downtown and they saved the French Quarter and the Garden District, the historical areas, the rich people, where the money is coming from, casinos and all that. And they drowned out all the poor people and the lower-middle class working people . . . And they do that all over the country, not just in New Orleans . . . they do stuff and then they lie, lie, lie” ” (Ace, Cordasco, Eisenman, Glik, Golden, page 277).
“Another person connected what he perceived as the breaking of the levees to issues of race, saying:
I believe they do these things intentionally . . . so they can flood out those Black neighborhoods . . . because every time they have a hurricane, it always be that way. You know?
Honesty and dishonesty encompass what is not said as well as what is said. Some evacuees felt useful information had been withheld from them. I heard from some people who watched the CNN news that these people knew about this hurricane a month ago” ” (Ace, Cordasco, Eisenman, Glik, Golden, page 277).
“These statements must be viewed in light of the participants having just experienced a horrific trauma, which clearly influenced their interpretations of events. In situations of fear and uncertainty people give more credence to negative perceptions. Furthermore, as participants were living collectively and exchanging information and perspectives, some individuals' distrust may have been amplified by conversations with other people living in the shelter. It is not possible from our interviews to separate this element of blame as stemming from a coping mechanism versus a reflection of underlying distrust.
“Despite these limitations, the evacuees' interpretations of events after Hurricane Katrina reflect an underlying, profound distrust of authorities. Evacuation and post-evacuation experiences heightened this distrust for some individuals. Given the importance of trust in disaster preparedness and communications, addressing existing distrust is critical to mounting effective responses in the future” (Ace, Cordasco, Eisenman, Glik, Golden, page 277).
“Each of these elements has specific implications for disaster planning and risk communication. The level of a community's distrust will be partially buffered based on the extent to which authorities display competency, fairness, empathy, honesty, and openness prior to a disaster. The historical depth of fiduciary concerns highlights the necessity of improving trust now between public officials and vulnerable communities where distrust may be long-standing and chronic. For instance, public health and emergency response officials charged with planning for disasters, from natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes, pandemic flu) to terrorist events should include community representatives-drawn from churches, social clubs, schools, or labor unions-at all levels of disaster planning and response. The success of involving churches in African American communities in other public health endeavors buttresses this recommendation. Ensuring that authorities are viewed as honest requires addressing both the completeness of information as well as its accuracy. People are more likely to trust authorities whom they view as genuinely concerned about the welfare of others” (Ace, Cordasco, Eisenman, Glik, Golden, page 277).
Authorities should have listened to the matters of distrust when making policy and direct outreach for crisis preparedness and communications. They should have clearly conveyed their thoughts to everyone in order to ensure everyone’s safety. Communication with others is what was lacked in this situation. When I arrived to Tampa Florida communication with others changed drastically. The stability conditions in the culture in Tampa Florida were slower than New Orleans, Louisiana. From what I gathered, Tampa is a great place to live for students or retirees. The cultures are made up of many diverse subcultures in Tampa, but in New Orleans, there weren’t that many different cultures. Tampa was more acceptant of diverse cultures, because there are so many different cultures in Florida. “By bridging these differences between Tampa and New Orleans, I successfully achieved intercultural communication. Ten years later, I have a lot of family and friends because I was:
- aware of differing social values
- aware of decision making customs: not all people like to make decisions quickly and efficiently;
- aware of concepts of time: not all people like to see time as money;
- aware of personal space: people from different cultures have different 'comfort zones';
- aware of body language: learn the basic differences in the way people supplement their words with body movement;
- aware of different etiquette rules or manners: what is polite in one culture may be considered rude in another;
- aware of legal and ethical behavior;
- Most importantly, I was aware of language barriers: English is the most prevalent language in international business, but it's a mistake to assume that everyone understands it. Louisianan’s accent is much heavier than Floridian’s accent, but now I see that most words are that are said are different but has the same meaning.
When communicating with others it is compared to providing customer service. Providing a high level of customer service is equivalent to providing a high level of customer satisfaction. When communicating with an employee about a negative situation, I would try to find out the root cause of his or her actions. With prior encounters with employees, I learned that they react negatively for a reason, and most of the time they think that they are the only person that have encountered that specific situation. Sometimes, they are embarrassed or ashamed to share what they are going through. If the employee has a problem that makes them feel uncomfortable at work, I would let the employee explain the situation, and after explaining it, we would also come to an agreed conclusion that he or she should do. If the issue is personal, I would try to assist the employee with sharing personal stories (if possible) about it (to try and put their mind at ease about it), and also coming up with a solution. After the issue that the employee had is “out in the open” and an agreed conclusion is made, I would also explain to the employee the issue has effected their work ethics, and if they would like to continue to for the company they cannot let issues effect their way of providing money for them or their family, and that is why they should speak with someone to address the issue. Sometimes, one cannot help others when they cannot help themselves, and if that applies to them they need to address the issue with all involved parties, so everyone can be on the same page. I would also ask the employee with that being said, since they (prior to us having that conversation) were upset, how can the employee provide “a high level of technical expertise and deliver excellent customer service?” Most times, a person’s tone or choice of diction shows what type of mood they are in. If it is face-to-face body posture plays a factor as well. I would then tell the employee that this is a warning, but if this problem persists I will then have to take further action and write the employee up (which goes in their employee profile/record), or they could possibly be terminated from the company.
In conclusion, one must collect facts about the topic before concluding. It might take some time to conclude considering some information is not as clear and more investigation needs to be done. Therefore, “Don’t Believe The Hype” about information or topics that YOU have not done research on.
References:
Asch, Steven M., Cordasco, Kristina M., Eisenman, David P., Glik, Deborah C., Golden, Joya
F. (2007). Jouurnal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved. Nashville, TN.
Cameron, G.T., Wilcox, D.L., Reber, B.H., Shin, J. (2008). Public Relations Today Managing
Competition and Conflict. Boston: Pearson.
F. (2007). Jouurnal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved. Nashville, TN.
Cameron, G.T., Wilcox, D.L., Reber, B.H., Shin, J. (2008). Public Relations Today Managing
Competition and Conflict. Boston: Pearson.
Childs, John Brown. 2005.Katrina: Rights and Responsibilities. Santa Cruz, CA: New Pacific
Press.
Hartman, Chester and Gregory D. Squires. 2006. There Is No Such Thing as a Natural Disaster:
Race, Class, and Hurricane Katrina. New York: Routledge.
Hartman, Chester and Gregory D. Squires. 2006. There Is No Such Thing as a Natural Disaster:
Race, Class, and Hurricane Katrina. New York: Routledge.
Troutt, David Dante. 2006. After the Storm: Black Intellectuals Explore the Meaning of
HurricaneKatrina. New York: New Press.
Itzkoff, Dave, (2010). If God Is Willing and Da Creek Don't Rise. New York, NY.http://ezinearticles.com/?Ten-Commandments-of-Intercultural-Communication&id=120247
